SanDiegoVille published an article earlier this week based substantially on a September 2 investigation by Voice of San Diego concerning the approximately $383 million in public bond financing used to help develop Gaylord Pacific. That reporting raised legitimate questions about the increasing long-term cost of the debt, current reliance on reserve funds and an upcoming refinancing, but it also appears to have conflated two very different financial benchmarks when comparing projections from 2022 with expectations today.
SanDiegoVille repeated that comparison in its original article. After the City of Chula Vista challenged the characterization and provided detailed responses and earlier public documentation, we reviewed the issue again and are correcting the record.
At the center of the confusion is the difference between tax revenues exceeding annual bond debt service and the project generating enough money to produce residual cash flow to the City and Port after other obligations are satisfied.
Voice of San Diego accurately reported that a 2022 economic analysis predicted that by Gaylord Pacific's second year of operations, "the city will begin to receive amounts [of tax revenue] in excess of what is necessary to service the [bond] debt." But later in the same article, Voice characterized that projection much more broadly, writing that the 2022 analysis predicted the resort would create "positive cash flow for the city and port in its second year." The two concepts are apparently not equivalent.
Under the project's Revenue Sharing Agreement, revenues pass through a series of priority payments and reimbursements before the City of Chula Vista and Port of San Diego can divide what remains. A public presentation from 2018 provided to SanDiegoVille by the City shows six priority levels.
First, the Port District is reimbursed for its annual contribution. The City is then reimbursed for 73.6 percent of actual Bayfront fire-services costs, followed by reimbursement to the City and Port for General Fund contributions made before and after close of escrow.
The financing structure then provides for an additional year of debt-service reserves or a reserve-fund insurance policy. Only after those obligations are satisfied are remaining revenues split 50/50 between Chula Vista and the Port.
Most importantly, the 2018 presentation expressly states: "Residual Revenues Expected in Lease Year 19."
That document predates the 2022 bond issuance by several years and Gaylord Pacific's 2025 opening by nearly seven years. It therefore substantially undermines the premise that officials once expected the City and Port to begin receiving residual positive cash flow in Gaylord's second year, only to recently push that milestone nearly two decades into the future.
Instead, the available information indicates that two different milestones were being discussed.
The 2022 analysis projected that project-generated tax revenues could exceed annual bond debt service relatively early in Gaylord's operations. The much later year-19 benchmark concerns the point at which enough money would remain after debt service, government reimbursements, reserve requirements and other priority obligations for residual revenues to be divided between the City and Port.
Voice of San Diego appears to have treated those two benchmarks as though they were the same. SanDiegoVille relied on that reporting in its original article and repeated the resulting year-two-versus-year-19 comparison.
The City has also clarified another important issue: who is actually responsible for Gaylord Pacific's bond debt.
Voice reported that Chula Vista and the Port initially expected to spend approximately $870 million repaying the bonds and interest and that Deputy City Manager Sarah Schoen now expects the total cost to be higher. That remains accurate.
But Voice characterized the eventual amount as the "final total owed by taxpayers."
Chula Vista says that wording overstates taxpayer liability.
In response to detailed questions from SanDiegoVille, the City confirmed that the Bayfront bonds are not general-obligation debt of Chula Vista and that the City's unrestricted General Fund is not responsible for satisfying whatever amount may ultimately be owed to bondholders beyond the specific commitments made under the financing agreements.
That does not mean tax dollars are absent from the project.
The City confirmed that specified public revenues - including transient occupancy taxes, sales-tax revenues, property-related tax revenues and other City and Port revenues identified in the financing agreements - are committed to the financing structure.
Chula Vista also makes an annual General Fund contribution tied to its Municipal Services Agreement with the Port. The City says that contribution equals the amount received from the Port under the agreement as of July 1, 2017, increasing by 3 percent annually, and is subject to reimbursement under the Revenue Sharing Agreement.
Asked by SanDiegoVille whether the arrangement should most accurately be described as "taxpayer-backed," "tax-funded," "publicly financed" or "secured by specified tax revenues," the City said "publicly financed" is the most appropriate description because the financing involves a combination of tax and non-tax monies.
That is an important distinction.
Public money is unquestionably being used to support and repay the Gaylord Pacific financing. But Chula Vista residents have not guaranteed the entire bond debt, and taxpayers do not become generally liable for any shortfall if project revenues fail to meet expectations.
SanDiegoVille specifically asked what would happen if Gaylord and the other Bayfront revenue sources underperformed for a prolonged period and whether the City or Port could be required to increase General Fund contributions, redirect other City revenues or otherwise put more money into the financing.
The City said lenders required significant debt coverage specifically to protect against that risk and characterized such a scenario as highly unlikely.
"If this were to occur it would be a complex matter but the City (and Port) are under no obligation to add additional funds," the City told SanDiegoVille.
None of those clarifications eliminate the legitimate financial questions surrounding Gaylord Pacific.
Chula Vista and the Port still borrowed approximately $383 million through the Chula Vista Bayfront Facilities Financing Authority to help subsidize the sprawling 36-acre resort and convention center. When officials approved the development agreement in 2018, projections estimated that repaying the principal and interest would ultimately cost approximately $870 million.
Officials now expect that number to rise.
"The total cost of the debt will be higher than what was estimated in 2018," Schoen told Voice of San Diego.
Exactly how much higher remains unknown. Chula Vista and the Port are preparing to refinance the bonds, and the eventual interest rate, credit rating, tourism trends and broader economic conditions could materially affect how much the financing ultimately costs.
Current budget documents also show that Gaylord Pacific and two neighboring Bayfront properties are expected to generate approximately $25 million in taxes this fiscal year, while roughly $29 million in annual bond debt service is due. Voice reported that after accounting for the financing's various revenues and expenses, the Authority expects to use approximately $3 million from reserves to cover this year's payment.
That is not a default, nor does it mean Chula Vista residents are receiving an unexpected $3 million bill. A portion of the original bond proceeds was placed into reserves specifically to help cover expenses while the resort ramped up operations, and officials have said an early transition period was always contemplated.
The larger question is whether Gaylord Pacific ultimately produces enough new economic activity to justify the extraordinarily large public investment that made the project possible.
Gaylord Pacific opened in May 2025 with 1,600 rooms, multiple restaurants and bars, an approximately 4.25-acre water park and roughly 477,000 square feet of meeting, ballroom and convention space overlooking San Diego Bay. Marriott International operates the property under its Gaylord Hotels brand, while Houston-based RIDA Development developed the resort.
Chula Vista's own economic analysis concluded that the project would not have generated a sufficient return for its private developer without public assistance.
"But for the Economic Development Investment," the city's subsidy report concluded, "the RHCC Project would not generate sufficient ROI to the Developer and would therefore be financially infeasible."
That means public financing was not merely an incidental incentive. According to the City's own analysis, it was fundamental to making the project financially viable for the private developer.
The resort itself appears to be performing strongly.
Port Real Estate Director Adam Meyer told Voice that his own "napkin calculation" suggested the hotel was performing roughly 25 percent better than officials projected when they issued the bonds in 2022. Chula Vista Port Commissioner Ann Moore has gone further, telling South County business leaders earlier this year that Gaylord Pacific had become the third-highest-grossing Marriott property in the world.
Those claims are not necessarily inconsistent with the financing requiring reserves today or residual public revenues taking many years to materialize. The profitability and economic success of a privately operated hotel is different from the timetable under which public agencies recover contributions, replenish reserves and eventually divide residual revenue.
The planned refinancing may ultimately improve the picture.
Meyer argues that Gaylord Pacific is less risky today than when the original bonds were issued because the resort is now built and operating rather than merely proposed. He believes that reduced risk could translate into better borrowing terms.
"When a project is not built, it's risky," Meyer told Voice. "Now it's less risky. [We're] likely to have better interest rates than last time."
Schoen has been more cautious, noting that interest rates remain elevated and the City has only about a year of actual operating experience upon which to base long-term projections. Voice reported that officials are currently evaluating six refinancing scenarios.
That uncertainty remains the most consequential part of this story.
Gaylord Pacific may ultimately prove to be exactly the economic engine Chula Vista spent decades trying to bring to its waterfront. It could generate conventions, visitor spending, jobs, new development and enormous amounts of tax revenue for decades to come.
But the project's public financing remains massive, and officials now acknowledge the long-term cost of servicing that debt is expected to exceed the approximately $870 million originally projected.
What the City's clarification changes is not that public money is involved, nor that the financing deserves scrutiny. It changes two much more specific propositions: Chula Vista taxpayers do not have general liability for the entire Bayfront bond debt, and the expectation that residual revenues might not be divided between the City and Port until approximately Lease Year 19 was part of the financing plan years before Gaylord Pacific opened.
The more accurate question is therefore not whether Chula Vista taxpayers were promised Gaylord would "pay for itself" in two years and are suddenly discovering they may have to wait two decades. The real question is whether the hundreds of millions of dollars in public financing committed to one of the largest private developments in South Bay history will ultimately produce the economic return officials promised - and how much that financing will cost along the way.
That remains a significant story. But after reviewing the City's clarification and its 2018 documentation, it is not quite the story originally reported.
CORRECTION & UPDATE - September 6, 2026: An earlier version of this article relied substantially on a September 2 Voice of San Diego investigation that contrasted a 2022 projection concerning tax revenues exceeding annual bond debt service with a current projection concerning positive residual cash flow to the City and Port during years 15 through 19. Voice accurately quoted the 2022 analysis as referring to tax revenues "in excess of what is necessary to service the [bond] debt," but subsequently characterized that projection as predicting "positive cash flow for the city and port in its second year." A 2018 public presentation subsequently provided to SanDiegoVille by the City of Chula Vista shows that residual revenues available for a 50/50 City-Port split were expected in Lease Year 19 from the outset. SanDiegoVille repeated Voice's comparison in its original article and has corrected it because those are different financial benchmarks.
The original SanDiegoVille article also repeated Voice of San Diego's characterization of the total bond repayment as an amount effectively owed by taxpayers. Chula Vista has clarified that the bonds are not general obligations of the City and taxpayers do not have general liability for the debt, although specified tax revenues and other public revenues are committed to the financing. The City says "publicly financed" is the most accurate description, and SanDiegoVille has revised its terminology accordingly.
This article was initially based in significant part on reporting by Jim Hinch of Voice of San Diego and has been substantially updated following additional information and documentation provided by the City of Chula Vista.
Originally published September 2, 2026; substantially updated and corrected September 6, 2026.
